Sunday, December 27, 2015

Market practice – Letter of offer for takeovers filed with SEBI



In Indian capital markets and M&A transactions (especially in relation to listed company takeovers), a lot depends on the market practice, a term heavily used by lawyers and bankers assisting the companies in a specific acquisition deal.

Many a times while advising a client on aspects of a takeover transaction from the point of view of obtaining approval from Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) (technically there is no approval granted by SEBI, it issues an observation letter for the takeover process in relation to disclosures made and other compliances), the lawyers look at past precedents i.e., past successful takeover transactions which were approved by SEBI.

In this piece, I would like to capture some of the peculiar or some-what different transaction structures adopted by the parties to an acquisition transaction, where after review SEBI has granted approval for the takeover process under the SEBI Takeover Code. I have selected 6 important deals undertaken by reasonably decent bankers in India.

       I.            Acquisition of Astec Lifesciences Limited by Godrej Agrovet Limited (Merchant Banker: Kotak Mahindra]

1.      Additional Equity Shares: In terms of the SPA, the Acquirer has the option to additionally acquire upto 9,79,055 Equity Shares from the Sellers for a price of INR 190 for each additional Equity Share, if after the Offer the Acquirer does not hold 50.32% of the Voting Share Capital

Takeaways: SEBI is fine with the call option available to the acquirer in the event the acquirer is not able to acquire minimum number of shares it seeks to acquire.

2.      Downward adjustment: The price agreed to be paid by the Acquirer to the Sellers is INR 190 (Rupees One Hundred Ninety) per Sale Share, which price is subject to downward adjustments (if applicable) in accordance with the terms of the SPA, including but not limited to a reduction of INR 20,00,00,000 (Rupees Twenty Crore) from the Sale Consideration if the sale of ACCPL is not completed within 270 (Two Hundred Seventy) days from August 28, 2015 (i.e. date of execution of the SPA). ACCPL is a wholly owned subsidiary of the Target Company and as a condition to the transactions contemplated under the SPA the shares of ACCPL held by the Target Company will be sold within 270 days from August 28, 2015 (i.e., date of execution of the SPA).

Takeaways: SEBI is fine with the price adjustment clause amongst the sellers and the buyers in case of the SPA. However, such readjusted sale price is independent of the price offered to the shareholders (under Regulation 8 of the SEBI Takeover Code).

3.      Non-compete fees: The Sale Consideration to be paid by the Acquirer to the Sellers also includes an aggregate non-compete fee of INR 50,00,000 (Rupees Fifty Lacs).

Takeaways: The consideration of Rs. 50 Lakhs appears to be less considering the stakes involved in the transaction. Perhaps, the amount negotiated for the offer price had taken into consideration/ factored-in the non-compete payment involved in this transaction. Additionally, the amount for non-compete here is a show-case amount intended to lessen the stamp duty burden and also an instrument to capture all the typical provisions involed for non-compete such as time period, area of operation, relevant product and geographic market etc.

4.      Reps & Warranties and Indemnity: In this context, the Sellers have set aside a certain sum of money in an escrow account which may be drawn on by the Acquirer upon (a) suffering any losses from the breach or inaccuracy of the representations and warranties, and (b) occurrence of certain identified events.

Takeaways: This is a typical clause in a M&A SPA agreement. However, the time period of keeping the money in escrow account is important, which could vary from 12 months to 18 months post-closing depending on the transaction. SEBI is fine with such clauses as this does not have an impact on shareholders who are tendering the shares in the open offer.

5.      Continuing Shareholding of Mr. Ashok Hiremath: Mr. Ashok V. Hiremath will continue to hold 10% of Voting Share Capital assuming the Acquirer does not acquire the Additional Equity Sharesin the Target Company,and subject to other terms of the SPA for a period of two (2) years from the completion of the acquisition of the Sale Shares, in accordance with the SPA and will continue as a Promoter of the Target Company.

Takeaways: This is matter of private agreement between the parties.

6.      Sellers not to acquire Equity Shares under the creeping acquisition method: The Sellers have agreed that (a) till two (2) years from the completion of the acquisition of the Sale Shares in accordance with the SPA, or (b) till the time the Sellers cease to be classified as 'promoters' as per the SEBI (ICDR) Regulations, the Sellers or their affiliates will not acquire any shares of the Target Company without the prior written approval of the Acquirer.

Takeaways: This is matter of private agreement between the parties.

7.      Tag Along Right: For a period of upto two (2) years from the completion of the acquisition of the Sale Shares in accordance with the SPA, if the Acquirer intends to sell any equity shares of the Target Company, then Mr. Ashok V. Hiremath will have the right to 'tag along' and sell the equity shares of the Target Company held by him along with the Acquirer, in accordance with the terms of the SPA.

Takeaways: This is matter of private agreement between the parties.

8.      In this transaction the price per share offered to public shareholders was more than as was negotiated between the acquirer and the sellers under the SPA.

    II.            Acquisition of ADI Finchem Limited by FIH Mauritius Investments (Merchant Banker: ICICI Securities]

1.      As per the terms of the SPA, the Sellers have the ability to undertake inter-se transfer amongst themselves after the execution date of the SPA i.e. November 4, 2015, provided that such Sellers complete such transfer within 30 (Thirty) days from the date of execution of the SPA i.e. November 4, 2015 

Takeaways: The stage between the signing and closing of the agreement is addressed here. Under Regulation 10 of the SEBI Takeover Code, inter-se transfer of shares amongst the promoters is exempted from making an open offer. Such an eventuality is addressed here. SEBI appears to be fine with the inter group or inter se transfer of shares amongst the promoters for the purposes of internal restructuring before selling the shares as per the terms of the open offer.

 III.            Acquisition of Igarshi Motors India Limited by Igarhsi Electric Works Limited, MAPE (PAC 1), Alpha FDI Holdings (PAC 2), TCGF-I (PAC 3), IEW HK (PAC 4)AGILE (PAC 5) (Merchant Banker: Religare Investment banking]

1.      The Public Announcement at paragraph 3, stated that PAC 4 is not acting in concert with the Acquirer or MAGPL for the purpose of the Offer, but subsequently, PAC 4 has joined as a person acting in concert with the Acquirer and other PACs for the purpose of the Offer.

2.      Pursuant to the completion of the underlying transaction under the SPA, PAC 5 has joined as a person acting in concert with the Acquirer and other PACs for the Offer

Takeaways: The above two disclosures suggests that post initial public announcement for the takeover, the acquirers can name one or more person acting in concert in the following documents such as detailed public statements, letter of offer or for that matter in a addendum issued after the public announcement is made as to the inclusion of new PACs.

  IV.            Acquisition of IIFL by FIH Investments, HWIC Asia Fund (PAC 1), I Investments (PAC 2), FIH Private Investments (PAC 3) [Merchant Banker: ICICI Securities]

1.      The offer was subject to approval by SEBI (Mutual Fund Division) and the Cabinet Committee on Economic Affairs

2.      The Offer is not made pursuant to any transaction

3.      The Offer to the Equity Shareholders of the Target Company is being made pursuant to Regulation 3(1) of the SEBI (SAST) Regulations involving substantial acquisition of the Equity Shares without any change in control/ management of the Target Company. The Acquirer and PAC do not intend to control the management of the Target Company or induct additional directors representing the Acquirer and/or the PAC on the board of the Target Company. There will be no change in the promoters of the Target Company.

Takeaways: The acquirers are making a disclosure that they are merely sleeping partners with no control rights. Even though, the acquirer is a white knight or fear that somebody in future will take over the company, it is a good idea to acquire as much share as possible and disclose to the SEBI that they are not in control but just the strategic investor.

4.      The Acquirer and PAC have provided the following undertakings to SEBI (separately referred to as “Undertaking” and jointly as “Undertakings”) in respect of the Offer by way of letter dated October 01, 2015 (“Reply Letter”):
i.        The Acquirer and PAC shall not exercise voting rights on resolutions placed before Equity Shareholders of the Target Company in relation to such number of Equity Shares held by the Acquirer and the PACs that represent more than 25% (Twenty Five percent) of the paid up equity share capital of the Target Company at the time of voting on the relevant resolution; and
ii.      The Acquirer and PAC shall not acquire additional Equity Shares after the completion of the Offer to exceed the Aggregate Fairfax Threshold, including by way of a creeping acquisition of upto 5% (Five percent) of the equity share capital under Regulation 3(2) of the SEBI (SAST) Regulations, unless the Acquirer and PAC make an open offer or obtain the prior consent of SEBI for such acquisition.
Takeaways: This is an interesting piece of undertaking. Perhaps this undertaking may be given by the acquirer and the PAC after SEBI had specifically demanded it from them. 

     V.            Acquisition of McNally Bharat Engineering Limited by EMC Limited [Merchant Banker: ICICI Securities]

1.      This offer was pursuant to preferential allotment of equity shares

  VI.            Acquisition of Tasty Bite Eatables Limited by Kagome Co. Ltd (Acquirer), Preferred Brands Foods (India) Private Limited (PAC) [Merchant Banker: ICICI Securities]

1.      This Offer is made by the Acquirer and the PAC to all Eligible Shareholders, to acquire up to 6,61,490 (six lakhs sixty one thousand four hundred and ninety) Equity Shares, representing 25.78% shares of the target company.

Takeaways: This was a case where the public shareholding (i.e., shareholding other than the acquirers and PACs), was 25.78% and under the SEBI Takeover Code, the minimum shares to be acquired is 26% as per Regulation 7 of the SEBI Takeover Code. Further in terms of Regulation 7(4), if the acquirer acquires shares so as to result in public shareholding less than 25%, then in terms of SCRR the acquirer is required to shred out the extra shareholding so as to keep the minimum public shareholding upto 25%. In this case, as per the post-offer report, the number of shares acquired were 300 shares i.e., 0.01% shares of the target company.


Monday, December 7, 2015

Drafting a correct merger filing in India for CCI approval – Part III (non-compete clause)



6.6 In case the agreements/ other documents relating to the combination contain a non-compete clause or the parties to the combination have executed/ or propose to execute a non-competition agreement, in relation to the combination, the following details must be provided:

6.6.1 Scope, including: (i) the enterprises covered by the non-compete provision; and (ii) period; geographic scope and the products/ services covered under the non-compete clauses.

6.6.2 Justification for the non-compete provisions covering each of the elements as mentioned above.

Practice followed

Execution of contracts with post-termination exclusivity clauses could be questioned by CCI as being restrictive and exclusionary if: (a) the term of such clauses exceeds a reasonable period; (b) the subject matter of exclusivity is extremely wide; and (c) the geographical scope of exclusivity is extremely wide.

As a general practice, duration of post-termination exclusivity or non-compete for more than 3 years (unless it can be justified on an objective basis) has not been looked upon favourably by the CCI because as per CCI such a practice leads to market foreclosure.

The CCI has sought behavioural commitments in - Orchid Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals Limited/Hospira Healthcare India Private Limited:[1]

The transaction in this case related to the pharmaceutical sector and the non-compete obligation as entered into between the parties is set out below:
·        

  •  the product scope of the non-compete extended to the target enterprise and the promoter of the target enterprise in relation to certain business activities relating to the business division that was transferred, i.e. research, development and testing of injectable formulations of certain kinds of active pharmaceutical ingredients; and
  •  the time period of non-competition extended to 5 years on the target enterprise and 8 years on the promoter.
As a justification for the same the parties to the Hospira-Orchid combination review contended that the incorporation of such non-compete clauses was a standard industry practice, which was ‘generally considered necessary for the effective implementation of the proposed combination and allows the acquirer to obtain full value from the acquired assets’.

Being questioned by the CCI, the parties suggested certain modifications in the Hospira-Orchid matter by offering to reduce the time period to four years in relation to the domestic market in India and removed certain R&D restrictions, which were accepted by the CCI

CCI in its order noted:

“non compete obligations, if deemed necessary to be incorporated, should be reasonable particularly in respect of (a) the duration over which such restraint is enforceable; and (b) the business activities, geographical areas and person(s) subject to such restraint, so as to ensure that such obligations do not result in an appreciable adverse effect on competition.”

While reviewing the combination notification, CCI may ask for the agreement to be submitted to it for review.

In view of the CCI, the non-compete clause should only cover those products which are being currently developed, manufactured or sold by the target entities; and thus acquirer was issued notice to provide a justification for the above non-compete clauses. The blanket restrictions as to scope (time period and the products covered) are generally questioned by CCI and are not favourably seen.

Guidance Notes

The justification for the length/ scope of the non-compete agreement may be provided by taking into account, inter alia, the following factors:

  • Time taken by a new entrant to gain at least 5% in the relevant market
  • Nature of the industry
  • Time required for obtaining regulatory approvals in the industry and the gestation period specific to the sector
  • Any other transaction with specific details
The above are very rough and very broad guidelines for determining/ assessing the AAEC of such non-compete clauses in the agreements. Therefore, it will be expedient for the parties to carefully draft the non-competition agreement and carefully conduct its due diligence while ascertaining the scope and nature of the industry involved and the non-compete sought.


[1]       (C-2012/09/79).