Sunday, December 27, 2015

Market practice – Letter of offer for takeovers filed with SEBI



In Indian capital markets and M&A transactions (especially in relation to listed company takeovers), a lot depends on the market practice, a term heavily used by lawyers and bankers assisting the companies in a specific acquisition deal.

Many a times while advising a client on aspects of a takeover transaction from the point of view of obtaining approval from Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) (technically there is no approval granted by SEBI, it issues an observation letter for the takeover process in relation to disclosures made and other compliances), the lawyers look at past precedents i.e., past successful takeover transactions which were approved by SEBI.

In this piece, I would like to capture some of the peculiar or some-what different transaction structures adopted by the parties to an acquisition transaction, where after review SEBI has granted approval for the takeover process under the SEBI Takeover Code. I have selected 6 important deals undertaken by reasonably decent bankers in India.

       I.            Acquisition of Astec Lifesciences Limited by Godrej Agrovet Limited (Merchant Banker: Kotak Mahindra]

1.      Additional Equity Shares: In terms of the SPA, the Acquirer has the option to additionally acquire upto 9,79,055 Equity Shares from the Sellers for a price of INR 190 for each additional Equity Share, if after the Offer the Acquirer does not hold 50.32% of the Voting Share Capital

Takeaways: SEBI is fine with the call option available to the acquirer in the event the acquirer is not able to acquire minimum number of shares it seeks to acquire.

2.      Downward adjustment: The price agreed to be paid by the Acquirer to the Sellers is INR 190 (Rupees One Hundred Ninety) per Sale Share, which price is subject to downward adjustments (if applicable) in accordance with the terms of the SPA, including but not limited to a reduction of INR 20,00,00,000 (Rupees Twenty Crore) from the Sale Consideration if the sale of ACCPL is not completed within 270 (Two Hundred Seventy) days from August 28, 2015 (i.e. date of execution of the SPA). ACCPL is a wholly owned subsidiary of the Target Company and as a condition to the transactions contemplated under the SPA the shares of ACCPL held by the Target Company will be sold within 270 days from August 28, 2015 (i.e., date of execution of the SPA).

Takeaways: SEBI is fine with the price adjustment clause amongst the sellers and the buyers in case of the SPA. However, such readjusted sale price is independent of the price offered to the shareholders (under Regulation 8 of the SEBI Takeover Code).

3.      Non-compete fees: The Sale Consideration to be paid by the Acquirer to the Sellers also includes an aggregate non-compete fee of INR 50,00,000 (Rupees Fifty Lacs).

Takeaways: The consideration of Rs. 50 Lakhs appears to be less considering the stakes involved in the transaction. Perhaps, the amount negotiated for the offer price had taken into consideration/ factored-in the non-compete payment involved in this transaction. Additionally, the amount for non-compete here is a show-case amount intended to lessen the stamp duty burden and also an instrument to capture all the typical provisions involed for non-compete such as time period, area of operation, relevant product and geographic market etc.

4.      Reps & Warranties and Indemnity: In this context, the Sellers have set aside a certain sum of money in an escrow account which may be drawn on by the Acquirer upon (a) suffering any losses from the breach or inaccuracy of the representations and warranties, and (b) occurrence of certain identified events.

Takeaways: This is a typical clause in a M&A SPA agreement. However, the time period of keeping the money in escrow account is important, which could vary from 12 months to 18 months post-closing depending on the transaction. SEBI is fine with such clauses as this does not have an impact on shareholders who are tendering the shares in the open offer.

5.      Continuing Shareholding of Mr. Ashok Hiremath: Mr. Ashok V. Hiremath will continue to hold 10% of Voting Share Capital assuming the Acquirer does not acquire the Additional Equity Sharesin the Target Company,and subject to other terms of the SPA for a period of two (2) years from the completion of the acquisition of the Sale Shares, in accordance with the SPA and will continue as a Promoter of the Target Company.

Takeaways: This is matter of private agreement between the parties.

6.      Sellers not to acquire Equity Shares under the creeping acquisition method: The Sellers have agreed that (a) till two (2) years from the completion of the acquisition of the Sale Shares in accordance with the SPA, or (b) till the time the Sellers cease to be classified as 'promoters' as per the SEBI (ICDR) Regulations, the Sellers or their affiliates will not acquire any shares of the Target Company without the prior written approval of the Acquirer.

Takeaways: This is matter of private agreement between the parties.

7.      Tag Along Right: For a period of upto two (2) years from the completion of the acquisition of the Sale Shares in accordance with the SPA, if the Acquirer intends to sell any equity shares of the Target Company, then Mr. Ashok V. Hiremath will have the right to 'tag along' and sell the equity shares of the Target Company held by him along with the Acquirer, in accordance with the terms of the SPA.

Takeaways: This is matter of private agreement between the parties.

8.      In this transaction the price per share offered to public shareholders was more than as was negotiated between the acquirer and the sellers under the SPA.

    II.            Acquisition of ADI Finchem Limited by FIH Mauritius Investments (Merchant Banker: ICICI Securities]

1.      As per the terms of the SPA, the Sellers have the ability to undertake inter-se transfer amongst themselves after the execution date of the SPA i.e. November 4, 2015, provided that such Sellers complete such transfer within 30 (Thirty) days from the date of execution of the SPA i.e. November 4, 2015 

Takeaways: The stage between the signing and closing of the agreement is addressed here. Under Regulation 10 of the SEBI Takeover Code, inter-se transfer of shares amongst the promoters is exempted from making an open offer. Such an eventuality is addressed here. SEBI appears to be fine with the inter group or inter se transfer of shares amongst the promoters for the purposes of internal restructuring before selling the shares as per the terms of the open offer.

 III.            Acquisition of Igarshi Motors India Limited by Igarhsi Electric Works Limited, MAPE (PAC 1), Alpha FDI Holdings (PAC 2), TCGF-I (PAC 3), IEW HK (PAC 4)AGILE (PAC 5) (Merchant Banker: Religare Investment banking]

1.      The Public Announcement at paragraph 3, stated that PAC 4 is not acting in concert with the Acquirer or MAGPL for the purpose of the Offer, but subsequently, PAC 4 has joined as a person acting in concert with the Acquirer and other PACs for the purpose of the Offer.

2.      Pursuant to the completion of the underlying transaction under the SPA, PAC 5 has joined as a person acting in concert with the Acquirer and other PACs for the Offer

Takeaways: The above two disclosures suggests that post initial public announcement for the takeover, the acquirers can name one or more person acting in concert in the following documents such as detailed public statements, letter of offer or for that matter in a addendum issued after the public announcement is made as to the inclusion of new PACs.

  IV.            Acquisition of IIFL by FIH Investments, HWIC Asia Fund (PAC 1), I Investments (PAC 2), FIH Private Investments (PAC 3) [Merchant Banker: ICICI Securities]

1.      The offer was subject to approval by SEBI (Mutual Fund Division) and the Cabinet Committee on Economic Affairs

2.      The Offer is not made pursuant to any transaction

3.      The Offer to the Equity Shareholders of the Target Company is being made pursuant to Regulation 3(1) of the SEBI (SAST) Regulations involving substantial acquisition of the Equity Shares without any change in control/ management of the Target Company. The Acquirer and PAC do not intend to control the management of the Target Company or induct additional directors representing the Acquirer and/or the PAC on the board of the Target Company. There will be no change in the promoters of the Target Company.

Takeaways: The acquirers are making a disclosure that they are merely sleeping partners with no control rights. Even though, the acquirer is a white knight or fear that somebody in future will take over the company, it is a good idea to acquire as much share as possible and disclose to the SEBI that they are not in control but just the strategic investor.

4.      The Acquirer and PAC have provided the following undertakings to SEBI (separately referred to as “Undertaking” and jointly as “Undertakings”) in respect of the Offer by way of letter dated October 01, 2015 (“Reply Letter”):
i.        The Acquirer and PAC shall not exercise voting rights on resolutions placed before Equity Shareholders of the Target Company in relation to such number of Equity Shares held by the Acquirer and the PACs that represent more than 25% (Twenty Five percent) of the paid up equity share capital of the Target Company at the time of voting on the relevant resolution; and
ii.      The Acquirer and PAC shall not acquire additional Equity Shares after the completion of the Offer to exceed the Aggregate Fairfax Threshold, including by way of a creeping acquisition of upto 5% (Five percent) of the equity share capital under Regulation 3(2) of the SEBI (SAST) Regulations, unless the Acquirer and PAC make an open offer or obtain the prior consent of SEBI for such acquisition.
Takeaways: This is an interesting piece of undertaking. Perhaps this undertaking may be given by the acquirer and the PAC after SEBI had specifically demanded it from them. 

     V.            Acquisition of McNally Bharat Engineering Limited by EMC Limited [Merchant Banker: ICICI Securities]

1.      This offer was pursuant to preferential allotment of equity shares

  VI.            Acquisition of Tasty Bite Eatables Limited by Kagome Co. Ltd (Acquirer), Preferred Brands Foods (India) Private Limited (PAC) [Merchant Banker: ICICI Securities]

1.      This Offer is made by the Acquirer and the PAC to all Eligible Shareholders, to acquire up to 6,61,490 (six lakhs sixty one thousand four hundred and ninety) Equity Shares, representing 25.78% shares of the target company.

Takeaways: This was a case where the public shareholding (i.e., shareholding other than the acquirers and PACs), was 25.78% and under the SEBI Takeover Code, the minimum shares to be acquired is 26% as per Regulation 7 of the SEBI Takeover Code. Further in terms of Regulation 7(4), if the acquirer acquires shares so as to result in public shareholding less than 25%, then in terms of SCRR the acquirer is required to shred out the extra shareholding so as to keep the minimum public shareholding upto 25%. In this case, as per the post-offer report, the number of shares acquired were 300 shares i.e., 0.01% shares of the target company.


Monday, December 7, 2015

Drafting a correct merger filing in India for CCI approval – Part III (non-compete clause)



6.6 In case the agreements/ other documents relating to the combination contain a non-compete clause or the parties to the combination have executed/ or propose to execute a non-competition agreement, in relation to the combination, the following details must be provided:

6.6.1 Scope, including: (i) the enterprises covered by the non-compete provision; and (ii) period; geographic scope and the products/ services covered under the non-compete clauses.

6.6.2 Justification for the non-compete provisions covering each of the elements as mentioned above.

Practice followed

Execution of contracts with post-termination exclusivity clauses could be questioned by CCI as being restrictive and exclusionary if: (a) the term of such clauses exceeds a reasonable period; (b) the subject matter of exclusivity is extremely wide; and (c) the geographical scope of exclusivity is extremely wide.

As a general practice, duration of post-termination exclusivity or non-compete for more than 3 years (unless it can be justified on an objective basis) has not been looked upon favourably by the CCI because as per CCI such a practice leads to market foreclosure.

The CCI has sought behavioural commitments in - Orchid Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals Limited/Hospira Healthcare India Private Limited:[1]

The transaction in this case related to the pharmaceutical sector and the non-compete obligation as entered into between the parties is set out below:
·        

  •  the product scope of the non-compete extended to the target enterprise and the promoter of the target enterprise in relation to certain business activities relating to the business division that was transferred, i.e. research, development and testing of injectable formulations of certain kinds of active pharmaceutical ingredients; and
  •  the time period of non-competition extended to 5 years on the target enterprise and 8 years on the promoter.
As a justification for the same the parties to the Hospira-Orchid combination review contended that the incorporation of such non-compete clauses was a standard industry practice, which was ‘generally considered necessary for the effective implementation of the proposed combination and allows the acquirer to obtain full value from the acquired assets’.

Being questioned by the CCI, the parties suggested certain modifications in the Hospira-Orchid matter by offering to reduce the time period to four years in relation to the domestic market in India and removed certain R&D restrictions, which were accepted by the CCI

CCI in its order noted:

“non compete obligations, if deemed necessary to be incorporated, should be reasonable particularly in respect of (a) the duration over which such restraint is enforceable; and (b) the business activities, geographical areas and person(s) subject to such restraint, so as to ensure that such obligations do not result in an appreciable adverse effect on competition.”

While reviewing the combination notification, CCI may ask for the agreement to be submitted to it for review.

In view of the CCI, the non-compete clause should only cover those products which are being currently developed, manufactured or sold by the target entities; and thus acquirer was issued notice to provide a justification for the above non-compete clauses. The blanket restrictions as to scope (time period and the products covered) are generally questioned by CCI and are not favourably seen.

Guidance Notes

The justification for the length/ scope of the non-compete agreement may be provided by taking into account, inter alia, the following factors:

  • Time taken by a new entrant to gain at least 5% in the relevant market
  • Nature of the industry
  • Time required for obtaining regulatory approvals in the industry and the gestation period specific to the sector
  • Any other transaction with specific details
The above are very rough and very broad guidelines for determining/ assessing the AAEC of such non-compete clauses in the agreements. Therefore, it will be expedient for the parties to carefully draft the non-competition agreement and carefully conduct its due diligence while ascertaining the scope and nature of the industry involved and the non-compete sought.


[1]       (C-2012/09/79).

Thursday, November 19, 2015

Airline cartel in India: Penalty imposed by CCI, is it justified?



Background

Express Industry Council of India filed a complaint (No. 30 of 2013) before the Competition Commission of India (“CCI”) against Jet Airways, Indigo, SpiceJet, Air India and Go Air (collectively, “Opposite Parties”) alleging that the Opposite Parties had formed a cartel to introduce Fuel Surcharge (“FSC”) for transportation of cargo which was anti-competitive in terms of the Competition Act, 2002.

It was also alleged that though the levy of FSC was introduced as extra charges linked to the fuel prices there has been no corresponding decrease in the same with a fall in the fuel prices.

Case and investigation proceedings

CCI by its order dated September 9, 2013 held that the averments and allegations made in the complaint prima facie indicate the existence of an agreement between the opposite parties to determine the fuel prices which requires a detailed investigation by the Director General (“DG”).

Thereafter, the DG issued a notice dated November 27, 2013 calling for, among other things, certain information on ownership pattern, organization structure, copies of memorandum of association and articles of association of the Opposite Parties in order to investigate the matter.

The DG submitted his investigation report dated February 4, 2015 with the CCI wherein it was concluded that there is no sufficient evidence to conclude the existence of a cartel in terms of Section 3 (1) read with Section 3(3) (a) of the Competition Act.

Order of the CCI

While rejecting the investigation report of the DG, vide its order dated November 17, 2015 CCI held that Jet Airways, Indigo and SpiceJet have acted in concerted manner in fixing and the revising the FSC rates and thereby contravened the provisions of the Competition Act.

Concept of ‘agreement’ explained

On the definition of term CCI opined that:

“the definition of “agreement” as given in Section 2(b) of the Competition Act requires inter alia any arrangement or understanding or action in concert whether or not formal or in writing or intended to be enforceable by legal proceedings. The definition, being inclusive and not exhaustive, is a wide one. The understanding may be tacit and the definition covers situations where the parties act on the basis of a nod or wink. There is rarely a direct evidence of action in concert and in such situation the Commission has to determine whether those involved in such dealings had some form of understanding and were acting in cooperation with each other. In the light of the definition of the term “agreement”, the Commission has to find sufficiency of evidence on the basis of benchmark of preponderance of probabilities”.

Existence of hub and spoke model

The CCI held that, the fact that since the prohibition on participating in anti-competitive agreements and the penalties the offenders may incur being well known, it is normal that such anti-competitive activities are conducted in a clandestine manner, where the meetings are held in secret and the associated documentation reduced to a minimum. CCI further opined that, even if the Commission discovers evidence explicitly showing unlawful conduct between enterprises such as the minutes of a meeting, it will normally be only fragmentary and sparse, so that it is often necessary to reconstruct certain details by deduction. In most cases, the existence of an anti-competitive practice or agreement must be inferred from a number of coincidences and indicia which, taken together, may, in the absence of any other plausible explanation, constitute evidence of the existence of an agreement.

Further in their arguments before the CCI, Opposite Parties stated that information on price behaviour of competitor’s price revision on FSC is received through multiple sources including common agents. In response, the CCI while concluding this to be a case of collusive behaviour held that:

“It is clearly evident that the airlines were well aware of the changes in FSC rates, if any, by their competitors in advance. The increments of the rates on same dates or nearby dates are reflective of some sort of understanding amongst the Opposite Parties”.

Lack of explanation offered by the Opposite Parties

CCI was not satisfied by the arguments, evidences and economic studies offered by the Opposite Parties. Further in its analysis of the facts of the case, where, the Opposite Parties admitted that the representatives of the Opposite Parties met several times before increasing the FSC price, but failed to disclose any evidence (in form of minutes of meetings, e-mail exchanges etc), CCI opined that:

“In these circumstances, the plea taken by the parties contending that no records of the meetings where FSC rates are determined and maintained does not inspire any confidence”.

CCI further held that:

“The unreasonable explanation of increase of FSC rates clubbed with no data on cost analysis, evasive replies and no documents despite admitting to the fact that meeting/ discussions took place with regard to FSC rate only further confirm the fact that airlines were acting in concerted manner. Though there is no evidence of direct meetings, the OPs participated in passive manner as they had the requisite means to access and exchange information though their common agents and circulars. This also shows that the OPs had a way to express their intentions in the market indirectly. In view of the foregoing, it is opined that the OPs have acted in parallel and the only plausible reason for increment of FSC rates by the airlines was collusion amongst them”.

Cartel activities are per se illegal

CCI, as held in various previous cases, stated that:

“In case of agreements as listed in section 3(3) (a) - (d) of the Act, once it is established that such an agreement exists, it will be presumed that the agreement has an appreciable adverse effect on competition; the onus to rebut the presumption would lie upon the opposite parties. In the present case, the opposite parties could not rebut the said presumption. It has not been shown by the opposite parties how the impugned conduct resulted into accrual of benefits to consumers or made improvements in production or distribution of goods in question. Neither, the opposite parties could explain as to how the said conduct did not foreclose competition”.

Analysis of the case

In times to come, this order of CCI will be discussed threadbare and at lengths by practitioners across sectors. This order may not be a full proof order and may face reversal (just like recent orders in the matter of Thomas Cook case and Chemist and Druggist Association, Ferozpur case) at the appellate tribunal stage. My reasons are as follows:


  • Mere similarity in prices or other features that may be observed in an oligopoly which are due to unilateral decision making by the firms alone cannot be considered as proof of an anti-competitive agreement between the firms in the absence of substantially compelling plus factors.
  • Market practice of knowing the prices or price list of the competitors through the common distributors, stockists, agents etc., are a normal practice in India and is a price discovery mechanism and not price collusion mechanism. In India, often various players in an industry follow the market practices of the leader of the industry.


Conclusion

COMPAT will have to weigh this case and ponder over the fact that will penalizing Opposite Parties will be justified only for the reason that the Opposite Parties had no evidence for the meeting which occurred between the representatives and can this be a sole argument for penalising these parties. In case COMPAT is in agreement with CCI, then plethora of cases in the nature of hub and spoke cartel will come up and the enterprises in India will have to jack up their competition compliance mechanisms.