Showing posts with label Takeover code. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Takeover code. Show all posts

Sunday, December 27, 2015

Market practice – Letter of offer for takeovers filed with SEBI



In Indian capital markets and M&A transactions (especially in relation to listed company takeovers), a lot depends on the market practice, a term heavily used by lawyers and bankers assisting the companies in a specific acquisition deal.

Many a times while advising a client on aspects of a takeover transaction from the point of view of obtaining approval from Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) (technically there is no approval granted by SEBI, it issues an observation letter for the takeover process in relation to disclosures made and other compliances), the lawyers look at past precedents i.e., past successful takeover transactions which were approved by SEBI.

In this piece, I would like to capture some of the peculiar or some-what different transaction structures adopted by the parties to an acquisition transaction, where after review SEBI has granted approval for the takeover process under the SEBI Takeover Code. I have selected 6 important deals undertaken by reasonably decent bankers in India.

       I.            Acquisition of Astec Lifesciences Limited by Godrej Agrovet Limited (Merchant Banker: Kotak Mahindra]

1.      Additional Equity Shares: In terms of the SPA, the Acquirer has the option to additionally acquire upto 9,79,055 Equity Shares from the Sellers for a price of INR 190 for each additional Equity Share, if after the Offer the Acquirer does not hold 50.32% of the Voting Share Capital

Takeaways: SEBI is fine with the call option available to the acquirer in the event the acquirer is not able to acquire minimum number of shares it seeks to acquire.

2.      Downward adjustment: The price agreed to be paid by the Acquirer to the Sellers is INR 190 (Rupees One Hundred Ninety) per Sale Share, which price is subject to downward adjustments (if applicable) in accordance with the terms of the SPA, including but not limited to a reduction of INR 20,00,00,000 (Rupees Twenty Crore) from the Sale Consideration if the sale of ACCPL is not completed within 270 (Two Hundred Seventy) days from August 28, 2015 (i.e. date of execution of the SPA). ACCPL is a wholly owned subsidiary of the Target Company and as a condition to the transactions contemplated under the SPA the shares of ACCPL held by the Target Company will be sold within 270 days from August 28, 2015 (i.e., date of execution of the SPA).

Takeaways: SEBI is fine with the price adjustment clause amongst the sellers and the buyers in case of the SPA. However, such readjusted sale price is independent of the price offered to the shareholders (under Regulation 8 of the SEBI Takeover Code).

3.      Non-compete fees: The Sale Consideration to be paid by the Acquirer to the Sellers also includes an aggregate non-compete fee of INR 50,00,000 (Rupees Fifty Lacs).

Takeaways: The consideration of Rs. 50 Lakhs appears to be less considering the stakes involved in the transaction. Perhaps, the amount negotiated for the offer price had taken into consideration/ factored-in the non-compete payment involved in this transaction. Additionally, the amount for non-compete here is a show-case amount intended to lessen the stamp duty burden and also an instrument to capture all the typical provisions involed for non-compete such as time period, area of operation, relevant product and geographic market etc.

4.      Reps & Warranties and Indemnity: In this context, the Sellers have set aside a certain sum of money in an escrow account which may be drawn on by the Acquirer upon (a) suffering any losses from the breach or inaccuracy of the representations and warranties, and (b) occurrence of certain identified events.

Takeaways: This is a typical clause in a M&A SPA agreement. However, the time period of keeping the money in escrow account is important, which could vary from 12 months to 18 months post-closing depending on the transaction. SEBI is fine with such clauses as this does not have an impact on shareholders who are tendering the shares in the open offer.

5.      Continuing Shareholding of Mr. Ashok Hiremath: Mr. Ashok V. Hiremath will continue to hold 10% of Voting Share Capital assuming the Acquirer does not acquire the Additional Equity Sharesin the Target Company,and subject to other terms of the SPA for a period of two (2) years from the completion of the acquisition of the Sale Shares, in accordance with the SPA and will continue as a Promoter of the Target Company.

Takeaways: This is matter of private agreement between the parties.

6.      Sellers not to acquire Equity Shares under the creeping acquisition method: The Sellers have agreed that (a) till two (2) years from the completion of the acquisition of the Sale Shares in accordance with the SPA, or (b) till the time the Sellers cease to be classified as 'promoters' as per the SEBI (ICDR) Regulations, the Sellers or their affiliates will not acquire any shares of the Target Company without the prior written approval of the Acquirer.

Takeaways: This is matter of private agreement between the parties.

7.      Tag Along Right: For a period of upto two (2) years from the completion of the acquisition of the Sale Shares in accordance with the SPA, if the Acquirer intends to sell any equity shares of the Target Company, then Mr. Ashok V. Hiremath will have the right to 'tag along' and sell the equity shares of the Target Company held by him along with the Acquirer, in accordance with the terms of the SPA.

Takeaways: This is matter of private agreement between the parties.

8.      In this transaction the price per share offered to public shareholders was more than as was negotiated between the acquirer and the sellers under the SPA.

    II.            Acquisition of ADI Finchem Limited by FIH Mauritius Investments (Merchant Banker: ICICI Securities]

1.      As per the terms of the SPA, the Sellers have the ability to undertake inter-se transfer amongst themselves after the execution date of the SPA i.e. November 4, 2015, provided that such Sellers complete such transfer within 30 (Thirty) days from the date of execution of the SPA i.e. November 4, 2015 

Takeaways: The stage between the signing and closing of the agreement is addressed here. Under Regulation 10 of the SEBI Takeover Code, inter-se transfer of shares amongst the promoters is exempted from making an open offer. Such an eventuality is addressed here. SEBI appears to be fine with the inter group or inter se transfer of shares amongst the promoters for the purposes of internal restructuring before selling the shares as per the terms of the open offer.

 III.            Acquisition of Igarshi Motors India Limited by Igarhsi Electric Works Limited, MAPE (PAC 1), Alpha FDI Holdings (PAC 2), TCGF-I (PAC 3), IEW HK (PAC 4)AGILE (PAC 5) (Merchant Banker: Religare Investment banking]

1.      The Public Announcement at paragraph 3, stated that PAC 4 is not acting in concert with the Acquirer or MAGPL for the purpose of the Offer, but subsequently, PAC 4 has joined as a person acting in concert with the Acquirer and other PACs for the purpose of the Offer.

2.      Pursuant to the completion of the underlying transaction under the SPA, PAC 5 has joined as a person acting in concert with the Acquirer and other PACs for the Offer

Takeaways: The above two disclosures suggests that post initial public announcement for the takeover, the acquirers can name one or more person acting in concert in the following documents such as detailed public statements, letter of offer or for that matter in a addendum issued after the public announcement is made as to the inclusion of new PACs.

  IV.            Acquisition of IIFL by FIH Investments, HWIC Asia Fund (PAC 1), I Investments (PAC 2), FIH Private Investments (PAC 3) [Merchant Banker: ICICI Securities]

1.      The offer was subject to approval by SEBI (Mutual Fund Division) and the Cabinet Committee on Economic Affairs

2.      The Offer is not made pursuant to any transaction

3.      The Offer to the Equity Shareholders of the Target Company is being made pursuant to Regulation 3(1) of the SEBI (SAST) Regulations involving substantial acquisition of the Equity Shares without any change in control/ management of the Target Company. The Acquirer and PAC do not intend to control the management of the Target Company or induct additional directors representing the Acquirer and/or the PAC on the board of the Target Company. There will be no change in the promoters of the Target Company.

Takeaways: The acquirers are making a disclosure that they are merely sleeping partners with no control rights. Even though, the acquirer is a white knight or fear that somebody in future will take over the company, it is a good idea to acquire as much share as possible and disclose to the SEBI that they are not in control but just the strategic investor.

4.      The Acquirer and PAC have provided the following undertakings to SEBI (separately referred to as “Undertaking” and jointly as “Undertakings”) in respect of the Offer by way of letter dated October 01, 2015 (“Reply Letter”):
i.        The Acquirer and PAC shall not exercise voting rights on resolutions placed before Equity Shareholders of the Target Company in relation to such number of Equity Shares held by the Acquirer and the PACs that represent more than 25% (Twenty Five percent) of the paid up equity share capital of the Target Company at the time of voting on the relevant resolution; and
ii.      The Acquirer and PAC shall not acquire additional Equity Shares after the completion of the Offer to exceed the Aggregate Fairfax Threshold, including by way of a creeping acquisition of upto 5% (Five percent) of the equity share capital under Regulation 3(2) of the SEBI (SAST) Regulations, unless the Acquirer and PAC make an open offer or obtain the prior consent of SEBI for such acquisition.
Takeaways: This is an interesting piece of undertaking. Perhaps this undertaking may be given by the acquirer and the PAC after SEBI had specifically demanded it from them. 

     V.            Acquisition of McNally Bharat Engineering Limited by EMC Limited [Merchant Banker: ICICI Securities]

1.      This offer was pursuant to preferential allotment of equity shares

  VI.            Acquisition of Tasty Bite Eatables Limited by Kagome Co. Ltd (Acquirer), Preferred Brands Foods (India) Private Limited (PAC) [Merchant Banker: ICICI Securities]

1.      This Offer is made by the Acquirer and the PAC to all Eligible Shareholders, to acquire up to 6,61,490 (six lakhs sixty one thousand four hundred and ninety) Equity Shares, representing 25.78% shares of the target company.

Takeaways: This was a case where the public shareholding (i.e., shareholding other than the acquirers and PACs), was 25.78% and under the SEBI Takeover Code, the minimum shares to be acquired is 26% as per Regulation 7 of the SEBI Takeover Code. Further in terms of Regulation 7(4), if the acquirer acquires shares so as to result in public shareholding less than 25%, then in terms of SCRR the acquirer is required to shred out the extra shareholding so as to keep the minimum public shareholding upto 25%. In this case, as per the post-offer report, the number of shares acquired were 300 shares i.e., 0.01% shares of the target company.


Friday, July 29, 2011

SEBI Board on proposed new Takeover Regulations based on recommendation of TRAC

Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI or Board) finally met on 28 July, 2011 and took major decisions on the takeover regulations, which may impact takeover activities in times to come in India.
In this post, I would deal briefly with the decisions of SEBI on Takeover regulations.  Most of the recommendations of the Takeover Regulations Advisory Committee (TRAC) are accepted by the Board.  As per the press release PR No. 119/2011 dated 28 July, 2011, the Board took note of and decided the following:
(a)   Initial trigger threshold increased to 25% from existing 15%.

Takeaways of transactional lawyer

This is a welcome move for the industry.  Listed Indian corporates may tap-in more funds from strategic investors like Private Equity firms, foreign institutional investor, foreign venture capital investors, and of course Indian investors etc. without there being any need for open offer to acquire further 20% (now 26%) shares of the company.  SEBI in its wisdom increased the triggering limit to 25%- this I believe has to do with the changing times in emerging markets coupled with the prevalent view that strategic investors having no potential or willingness to further acquire equity in the company as they are not interested in control or day to day affairs of the company.  In times to come, I view a lot of investment happening in the listed companies where new shares would be issued to the strategic investors (in form of qualified institutional placement, rights issues, preferential allotment of shares etc).

(b)   There shall be no separate provision for non-compete fees and all shareholders shall be given exit at the same price.

Takeaways of transactional lawyer

Indian promoters exiting the business would hate this.  This decision is in-effect would null the verdicts of the Securities Appellate Tribunal (SAT) in the cases of E-Lands Fashion China Holdings v. SEBI (SAT 2011) and Tata Tea Limited v. SEBI (SAT 2008).  Recently, SEBI was also very slow on giving approvals to the takeover offers in cases where a non-compete fee clause was existing in a share purchase agreement (SPA) which was triggering the open offer.  Transactional lawyers drafting the SPAs should take note of the above and delete the non-compete fee clause and if not, they may be prepared with their litigation counter-parts to challenge this policy move before the court of law, but I believe Indian courts do not give any opinion where Government’s policy is involved.

(c)    In cases of competitive offers, the successful bidder can acquire shares of other bidders after the offer period without attracting open offer obligations.

Takeaways of transactional lawyer

This would certainly ease the takeover process, however it is not clear how this policy move would apply as in is there any time period or is it left open ended after the offer period has passed.  Under the present takeover code, the successful bidder can buy the shares of other bidders-there is no limitation on this.  Under the TRAC recommendation, within twenty-one business days from expiry of the offer period, any competing acquirer would be free to negotiate and acquire the shares tendered to the other competing acquirer, at the same price that was offered by him to the public. I hope this would be clarified when SEBI comes out with draft new takeover regulations for public comments.

(d)   Voluntary offers have been introduce subject to certain conditions.

(e)    A recommendation on the offer by the Board of Target Company has been made mandatory.

Takeaways of transactional lawyer

This move shows the graduation of maturity level in the Indian capital markets.  This is in line with the practices followed in US and the EU.  We might see the emergence of white knights and other takeover market practices prevalent in the US or the EU.

(f)     Existing definition of control shall be retained as it is.

Takeaways of transactional lawyer

Verdict of SAT is very clear on this.  Transactional lawyers should read and apply the holding in cased of Subhkam Ventures (I) Pvt. Ltd v. SEBI (SAT, 2010).

(g)   The minimum offer size shall be increased from the exiting 20% of the total issued capital to 26% of the total issued capital.
Takeaways of transactional lawyer
This is in line with initial triggering event at 25%, so under the proposed takeover regulations, pursuant to successful open offer and assuming that the existing shareholders tenders the shares upto 26%, this will lead to acquisition of 51%, therefore making the target company a subsidiary of the acquirer fulfilling the requirements of section 4 of the Companies Act, 1956 (Companies Act).  Under the Companies Act, any equity holding greater than 25% gives a right to block a ‘special resolution’, however this is a type of indirect control or negative control, with 51% equity shareholdings the acquirer would exercise the majority stake in the target company.  This is also in line with the definition of ‘control’ under section 5 of the Competition Act, 2002.

(h)   The Board did not accept the recommendation of TRAC to provide for delisting pursuant to an offer and proportionate acceptance.
Certainly, in times to come there is going be a lot of in-bound acquisition deals and these changes in takeover regulations may in short run as well as long run propel the acquisition activities of listed companies in India.