Showing posts with label SEBI. Show all posts
Showing posts with label SEBI. Show all posts

Sunday, December 27, 2015

Market practice – Letter of offer for takeovers filed with SEBI



In Indian capital markets and M&A transactions (especially in relation to listed company takeovers), a lot depends on the market practice, a term heavily used by lawyers and bankers assisting the companies in a specific acquisition deal.

Many a times while advising a client on aspects of a takeover transaction from the point of view of obtaining approval from Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) (technically there is no approval granted by SEBI, it issues an observation letter for the takeover process in relation to disclosures made and other compliances), the lawyers look at past precedents i.e., past successful takeover transactions which were approved by SEBI.

In this piece, I would like to capture some of the peculiar or some-what different transaction structures adopted by the parties to an acquisition transaction, where after review SEBI has granted approval for the takeover process under the SEBI Takeover Code. I have selected 6 important deals undertaken by reasonably decent bankers in India.

       I.            Acquisition of Astec Lifesciences Limited by Godrej Agrovet Limited (Merchant Banker: Kotak Mahindra]

1.      Additional Equity Shares: In terms of the SPA, the Acquirer has the option to additionally acquire upto 9,79,055 Equity Shares from the Sellers for a price of INR 190 for each additional Equity Share, if after the Offer the Acquirer does not hold 50.32% of the Voting Share Capital

Takeaways: SEBI is fine with the call option available to the acquirer in the event the acquirer is not able to acquire minimum number of shares it seeks to acquire.

2.      Downward adjustment: The price agreed to be paid by the Acquirer to the Sellers is INR 190 (Rupees One Hundred Ninety) per Sale Share, which price is subject to downward adjustments (if applicable) in accordance with the terms of the SPA, including but not limited to a reduction of INR 20,00,00,000 (Rupees Twenty Crore) from the Sale Consideration if the sale of ACCPL is not completed within 270 (Two Hundred Seventy) days from August 28, 2015 (i.e. date of execution of the SPA). ACCPL is a wholly owned subsidiary of the Target Company and as a condition to the transactions contemplated under the SPA the shares of ACCPL held by the Target Company will be sold within 270 days from August 28, 2015 (i.e., date of execution of the SPA).

Takeaways: SEBI is fine with the price adjustment clause amongst the sellers and the buyers in case of the SPA. However, such readjusted sale price is independent of the price offered to the shareholders (under Regulation 8 of the SEBI Takeover Code).

3.      Non-compete fees: The Sale Consideration to be paid by the Acquirer to the Sellers also includes an aggregate non-compete fee of INR 50,00,000 (Rupees Fifty Lacs).

Takeaways: The consideration of Rs. 50 Lakhs appears to be less considering the stakes involved in the transaction. Perhaps, the amount negotiated for the offer price had taken into consideration/ factored-in the non-compete payment involved in this transaction. Additionally, the amount for non-compete here is a show-case amount intended to lessen the stamp duty burden and also an instrument to capture all the typical provisions involed for non-compete such as time period, area of operation, relevant product and geographic market etc.

4.      Reps & Warranties and Indemnity: In this context, the Sellers have set aside a certain sum of money in an escrow account which may be drawn on by the Acquirer upon (a) suffering any losses from the breach or inaccuracy of the representations and warranties, and (b) occurrence of certain identified events.

Takeaways: This is a typical clause in a M&A SPA agreement. However, the time period of keeping the money in escrow account is important, which could vary from 12 months to 18 months post-closing depending on the transaction. SEBI is fine with such clauses as this does not have an impact on shareholders who are tendering the shares in the open offer.

5.      Continuing Shareholding of Mr. Ashok Hiremath: Mr. Ashok V. Hiremath will continue to hold 10% of Voting Share Capital assuming the Acquirer does not acquire the Additional Equity Sharesin the Target Company,and subject to other terms of the SPA for a period of two (2) years from the completion of the acquisition of the Sale Shares, in accordance with the SPA and will continue as a Promoter of the Target Company.

Takeaways: This is matter of private agreement between the parties.

6.      Sellers not to acquire Equity Shares under the creeping acquisition method: The Sellers have agreed that (a) till two (2) years from the completion of the acquisition of the Sale Shares in accordance with the SPA, or (b) till the time the Sellers cease to be classified as 'promoters' as per the SEBI (ICDR) Regulations, the Sellers or their affiliates will not acquire any shares of the Target Company without the prior written approval of the Acquirer.

Takeaways: This is matter of private agreement between the parties.

7.      Tag Along Right: For a period of upto two (2) years from the completion of the acquisition of the Sale Shares in accordance with the SPA, if the Acquirer intends to sell any equity shares of the Target Company, then Mr. Ashok V. Hiremath will have the right to 'tag along' and sell the equity shares of the Target Company held by him along with the Acquirer, in accordance with the terms of the SPA.

Takeaways: This is matter of private agreement between the parties.

8.      In this transaction the price per share offered to public shareholders was more than as was negotiated between the acquirer and the sellers under the SPA.

    II.            Acquisition of ADI Finchem Limited by FIH Mauritius Investments (Merchant Banker: ICICI Securities]

1.      As per the terms of the SPA, the Sellers have the ability to undertake inter-se transfer amongst themselves after the execution date of the SPA i.e. November 4, 2015, provided that such Sellers complete such transfer within 30 (Thirty) days from the date of execution of the SPA i.e. November 4, 2015 

Takeaways: The stage between the signing and closing of the agreement is addressed here. Under Regulation 10 of the SEBI Takeover Code, inter-se transfer of shares amongst the promoters is exempted from making an open offer. Such an eventuality is addressed here. SEBI appears to be fine with the inter group or inter se transfer of shares amongst the promoters for the purposes of internal restructuring before selling the shares as per the terms of the open offer.

 III.            Acquisition of Igarshi Motors India Limited by Igarhsi Electric Works Limited, MAPE (PAC 1), Alpha FDI Holdings (PAC 2), TCGF-I (PAC 3), IEW HK (PAC 4)AGILE (PAC 5) (Merchant Banker: Religare Investment banking]

1.      The Public Announcement at paragraph 3, stated that PAC 4 is not acting in concert with the Acquirer or MAGPL for the purpose of the Offer, but subsequently, PAC 4 has joined as a person acting in concert with the Acquirer and other PACs for the purpose of the Offer.

2.      Pursuant to the completion of the underlying transaction under the SPA, PAC 5 has joined as a person acting in concert with the Acquirer and other PACs for the Offer

Takeaways: The above two disclosures suggests that post initial public announcement for the takeover, the acquirers can name one or more person acting in concert in the following documents such as detailed public statements, letter of offer or for that matter in a addendum issued after the public announcement is made as to the inclusion of new PACs.

  IV.            Acquisition of IIFL by FIH Investments, HWIC Asia Fund (PAC 1), I Investments (PAC 2), FIH Private Investments (PAC 3) [Merchant Banker: ICICI Securities]

1.      The offer was subject to approval by SEBI (Mutual Fund Division) and the Cabinet Committee on Economic Affairs

2.      The Offer is not made pursuant to any transaction

3.      The Offer to the Equity Shareholders of the Target Company is being made pursuant to Regulation 3(1) of the SEBI (SAST) Regulations involving substantial acquisition of the Equity Shares without any change in control/ management of the Target Company. The Acquirer and PAC do not intend to control the management of the Target Company or induct additional directors representing the Acquirer and/or the PAC on the board of the Target Company. There will be no change in the promoters of the Target Company.

Takeaways: The acquirers are making a disclosure that they are merely sleeping partners with no control rights. Even though, the acquirer is a white knight or fear that somebody in future will take over the company, it is a good idea to acquire as much share as possible and disclose to the SEBI that they are not in control but just the strategic investor.

4.      The Acquirer and PAC have provided the following undertakings to SEBI (separately referred to as “Undertaking” and jointly as “Undertakings”) in respect of the Offer by way of letter dated October 01, 2015 (“Reply Letter”):
i.        The Acquirer and PAC shall not exercise voting rights on resolutions placed before Equity Shareholders of the Target Company in relation to such number of Equity Shares held by the Acquirer and the PACs that represent more than 25% (Twenty Five percent) of the paid up equity share capital of the Target Company at the time of voting on the relevant resolution; and
ii.      The Acquirer and PAC shall not acquire additional Equity Shares after the completion of the Offer to exceed the Aggregate Fairfax Threshold, including by way of a creeping acquisition of upto 5% (Five percent) of the equity share capital under Regulation 3(2) of the SEBI (SAST) Regulations, unless the Acquirer and PAC make an open offer or obtain the prior consent of SEBI for such acquisition.
Takeaways: This is an interesting piece of undertaking. Perhaps this undertaking may be given by the acquirer and the PAC after SEBI had specifically demanded it from them. 

     V.            Acquisition of McNally Bharat Engineering Limited by EMC Limited [Merchant Banker: ICICI Securities]

1.      This offer was pursuant to preferential allotment of equity shares

  VI.            Acquisition of Tasty Bite Eatables Limited by Kagome Co. Ltd (Acquirer), Preferred Brands Foods (India) Private Limited (PAC) [Merchant Banker: ICICI Securities]

1.      This Offer is made by the Acquirer and the PAC to all Eligible Shareholders, to acquire up to 6,61,490 (six lakhs sixty one thousand four hundred and ninety) Equity Shares, representing 25.78% shares of the target company.

Takeaways: This was a case where the public shareholding (i.e., shareholding other than the acquirers and PACs), was 25.78% and under the SEBI Takeover Code, the minimum shares to be acquired is 26% as per Regulation 7 of the SEBI Takeover Code. Further in terms of Regulation 7(4), if the acquirer acquires shares so as to result in public shareholding less than 25%, then in terms of SCRR the acquirer is required to shred out the extra shareholding so as to keep the minimum public shareholding upto 25%. In this case, as per the post-offer report, the number of shares acquired were 300 shares i.e., 0.01% shares of the target company.


Friday, July 29, 2011

SEBI Board on proposed new Takeover Regulations based on recommendation of TRAC

Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI or Board) finally met on 28 July, 2011 and took major decisions on the takeover regulations, which may impact takeover activities in times to come in India.
In this post, I would deal briefly with the decisions of SEBI on Takeover regulations.  Most of the recommendations of the Takeover Regulations Advisory Committee (TRAC) are accepted by the Board.  As per the press release PR No. 119/2011 dated 28 July, 2011, the Board took note of and decided the following:
(a)   Initial trigger threshold increased to 25% from existing 15%.

Takeaways of transactional lawyer

This is a welcome move for the industry.  Listed Indian corporates may tap-in more funds from strategic investors like Private Equity firms, foreign institutional investor, foreign venture capital investors, and of course Indian investors etc. without there being any need for open offer to acquire further 20% (now 26%) shares of the company.  SEBI in its wisdom increased the triggering limit to 25%- this I believe has to do with the changing times in emerging markets coupled with the prevalent view that strategic investors having no potential or willingness to further acquire equity in the company as they are not interested in control or day to day affairs of the company.  In times to come, I view a lot of investment happening in the listed companies where new shares would be issued to the strategic investors (in form of qualified institutional placement, rights issues, preferential allotment of shares etc).

(b)   There shall be no separate provision for non-compete fees and all shareholders shall be given exit at the same price.

Takeaways of transactional lawyer

Indian promoters exiting the business would hate this.  This decision is in-effect would null the verdicts of the Securities Appellate Tribunal (SAT) in the cases of E-Lands Fashion China Holdings v. SEBI (SAT 2011) and Tata Tea Limited v. SEBI (SAT 2008).  Recently, SEBI was also very slow on giving approvals to the takeover offers in cases where a non-compete fee clause was existing in a share purchase agreement (SPA) which was triggering the open offer.  Transactional lawyers drafting the SPAs should take note of the above and delete the non-compete fee clause and if not, they may be prepared with their litigation counter-parts to challenge this policy move before the court of law, but I believe Indian courts do not give any opinion where Government’s policy is involved.

(c)    In cases of competitive offers, the successful bidder can acquire shares of other bidders after the offer period without attracting open offer obligations.

Takeaways of transactional lawyer

This would certainly ease the takeover process, however it is not clear how this policy move would apply as in is there any time period or is it left open ended after the offer period has passed.  Under the present takeover code, the successful bidder can buy the shares of other bidders-there is no limitation on this.  Under the TRAC recommendation, within twenty-one business days from expiry of the offer period, any competing acquirer would be free to negotiate and acquire the shares tendered to the other competing acquirer, at the same price that was offered by him to the public. I hope this would be clarified when SEBI comes out with draft new takeover regulations for public comments.

(d)   Voluntary offers have been introduce subject to certain conditions.

(e)    A recommendation on the offer by the Board of Target Company has been made mandatory.

Takeaways of transactional lawyer

This move shows the graduation of maturity level in the Indian capital markets.  This is in line with the practices followed in US and the EU.  We might see the emergence of white knights and other takeover market practices prevalent in the US or the EU.

(f)     Existing definition of control shall be retained as it is.

Takeaways of transactional lawyer

Verdict of SAT is very clear on this.  Transactional lawyers should read and apply the holding in cased of Subhkam Ventures (I) Pvt. Ltd v. SEBI (SAT, 2010).

(g)   The minimum offer size shall be increased from the exiting 20% of the total issued capital to 26% of the total issued capital.
Takeaways of transactional lawyer
This is in line with initial triggering event at 25%, so under the proposed takeover regulations, pursuant to successful open offer and assuming that the existing shareholders tenders the shares upto 26%, this will lead to acquisition of 51%, therefore making the target company a subsidiary of the acquirer fulfilling the requirements of section 4 of the Companies Act, 1956 (Companies Act).  Under the Companies Act, any equity holding greater than 25% gives a right to block a ‘special resolution’, however this is a type of indirect control or negative control, with 51% equity shareholdings the acquirer would exercise the majority stake in the target company.  This is also in line with the definition of ‘control’ under section 5 of the Competition Act, 2002.

(h)   The Board did not accept the recommendation of TRAC to provide for delisting pursuant to an offer and proportionate acceptance.
Certainly, in times to come there is going be a lot of in-bound acquisition deals and these changes in takeover regulations may in short run as well as long run propel the acquisition activities of listed companies in India.

Tuesday, July 12, 2011

Irregular IPOs: Lessons from Vaswani Industries IPO

Market players in the Indian equity capital markets have been exposed by the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) of following a cartelized approach with respect to subscription and allotment of securities in an initial public offering (IPO) in a recent order dated 11 July, 2011 in the matter of issuance of shares by Vaswani Industries Limited (Vaswani Industries).
Various complaints were filed before the SEBI regarding deliberate huge withdrawals/ rejections after the closure of the Vaswani Industries IPO.  The issue was subscribed to the extent of 4.16 times and after the withdrawals/ rejections the issue subscription dropped to 1.28 times. During the investigation, SEBI found that there was collusion amongst the BRLM/ syndicate-sub syndicate members to the issue in artificially raising the demand of Vaswani Industries shares during the bidding period.
Contentions of Vaswani Industries and the BRLM/sole syndicate member
In brief, the contentions were (Vaswani Industries):
·         Company should not be penalized for unlawful acts of others;
·         In terms of section 71 of the Companies Act, 1956 (Companies Act), an allotment made by a company to an applicant could be voidable at the instance of the applicant only under two circumstances i.e. (i) an allotment made without ensuring the minimum subscription under section 69 of the Companies Act and (ii) an allotment is made without issue of prospectus under section 70 of the Companies Act.
In brief, the contentions were (BRLM/sole syndicate member (SSM)):
·         SSM is under no obligation to underwrite the Company’s IPO post-allotment;
·         If option of withdrawal of shares is ordered then requirements of regulation 26 (4) of SEBI (Issue of Capital and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, 2009 may not be satisfies;
·         SEBI has no power under section 73 of the Companies Act to declare the allotment null and void.
SEBI order
This order is not as impeccable as any other order passed by Dr. K.M. Abraham, Whole Time Member, SEBI.  The order appears to be a compromise between the SEBI and the Company under which, the Company would be allowed to list and trade and at the same time the Company give a withdrawal option to all the investors who have been allotted shares (in retail and non-institutional category) for such number of shares by which allotment ratio was impacted.
Takeaways for transactional lawyers
·         During the refund/withdrawals process, separate escrow demat account for crediting the shares that are offered to be put in place.
·         In case the is under-written, then the underwriters under the agreement may purchase or arrange purchases post-IPO of such number of shares so as to ensure that the subscription does not fall below the minimum level of subscription.
·         In case the issue is not under-written/ there is non-compliance of above the entire subscription money to be refunded to the investors and all shares so allotted shall be cancelled.
·         Section 71 of the Companies Act shall not be literally applied and the irregularly allotted shares shall be cancelled and the money refunded in the interest of the securities market.

Friday, July 8, 2011

Standardized Due-diligence norms for Merchant Bankers in a Public issue

Under regulation 64 of the Securities and Exchange Board of India (Issue of Capital and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, 2009 (ICDR Regulations), the lead merchant bankers shall exercise due diligence and satisfy himself about all the aspects of the issue including the veracity and adequacy of disclosure in the offer documents.  Further under schedule VI of the ICDR Regulations, the merchant bankers to the public issue are required to submit a due-diligence certificate (DD Certificate) to the Board.  In the DD Certificate, among other things, the merchant bankers are required to certify that they have examined various documents (including those relating to litigation like commercial disputes, patent disputes, disputes with collaborators, etc. and other material) in connection with the finalisation of the draft red herring prospectus (DRHP) and the prospectus submitted with the registrar of companies.  There is no format prescribed by SEBI/ or guidance issued by SEBI on the issue of due-diligence.  In practice, the due diligence work is outsourced by the merchant bankers to legal counsels (for legal due diligence) and accountants (for financial due diligence), who further have their own due-diligence check lists to conduct due-diligence over the issuer.  Most of the due-diligence checklists of the legal counsels are similar and standard and caters very well to the requirements prescribed under schedule VIII of the ICDR Regulations.

However, if a reports published in Business Standard (8 July, 2011, http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/regulator-wants-due-diligence-norms-for-merchant-bankers/441957/) is to be believed, SEBI wants to put in place standard guidelines for the due diligence process carried out by the merchant bankers for public issues.  In my view this move of SEBI is guided by the fact that SEBI is receiving quite a few sub-standard drafts of the DRHPs being filed with it and is aimed to enhance the quality of information (both in terms of uniformity and greater clarity) available to the public before investing in the public issue.  In furtherance of this objective, Association of Merchant Bankers of India (AMBI), had been asked by SEBI to come up with the draft guidelines by September, 2011.

These due-diligence guidelines (if it becomes a reality) would certainly make the work of capital markets lawyers a lot more-easier.  Further, I believe, the AMBI should also come up with a concrete answer to the standard question on insider trading aspects of the public issue (as in, is the company really worth as is stated in the price-band of the red-herring prospectus?) amongst various other issues like eligibility of issuers, corporate records, promoters etc..

Saturday, June 25, 2011

Highly leveraged takeover deal backed by KKR to acquire Yageo rejected by Investment Commission, Taiwan

Asia is living in exciting times.  Ministry of Economic Affairs’ Investment Commission (IC) rejected private equity (PE) fund Orion Investment Co (Orion) US$ 1.6 billion buyout of Yageo Corp (Yageo).  The reasons for rejection given by IC are:
  • lack of transparency in deciding acquisition price;
  • minority stakeholders’ interests could be at risk because of a lack of transparency in the stake-buying prospectus;
  • the debt ratio of the new company (as per the prospectus, after the takeover, Orion planned to delist Yageo from the Taiwan Stock Exchange (TWE) and thereafter merge with it), would surge, given that Orion had borrowed money to buy the shares (this being highly leveraged debt borrowing to the extent of NT$28 billion).

Structure of the proposed deal

Just like many other PE funded deals, in the present deal (Yageo deal), Orion in which Mr. Chen Tie-min holds 54.36% and KKR owns the remaining 45.64%, was planning to take Yageo (a manufacturer of passive components used in electronics) private from the TWE after the acquisition.  Orion was planning to spin off Yageo’s deferent component divisions after delisting and take these divisions to public in the future.

Structure of the Yageo deal is described below in a diagram.

The financing of Yageo deal is a bit-complex and  in stricto sensu, it’s a classic leverage buy-out (LBO) deal- and that’s what was opposed by the IC.  The Yageo deal was financed by- (a) own funds of the offeror; (b) shareholder loans; and (c) loans from local (loans from local Taiwan Banks and foreign banks in Taiwan upto NT$28 billion) and foreign financial institutions (UBS AG and Nomura International were roped in for loans upto US$ 957,745,000). 

Transaction Agreement for financing the Yageo deal

As per the transaction agreement (Transaction Agreement) dated 5 April, 2011 between (a) Mr. Chen Tie-min (Chairman and GM of the Target), HCHEL, SHDL, STHE, HTHL, HTL, Mr. Yoshiro Kubota and TMPC Holdings Limited (Founder Shareholders); (b) CHIL Parent (a holding company established by KKR) (CHIL Parent); and (c) AIHL (a JV between Founder Shareholders (through TMPC Holdings Limited) and CHIL Parent):

(a) On First Closing
  • Founder Shareholders to invest US$ 35,566,000 in TMPC Holdings Limited (TMPC HL), and cause TMPC HL to acquire loans from offshore financial institutions in an amount of approx US$ 218,064,000 (Founder Bridge).  TMPC HL to further invest the borrowed money and other cash (equivalent to US$ 253,630,000) in shares issued by AIHL.
  • CHIL Parent shall make it investment in AHIL by (i) 145,961,000 P-Notes issued by Citigroup Markets Global Holdings (P-Note Issuer) issued by Yageo; and (ii) all shares of CIHL held by CIHL Parent (CIHL holds 227,700,000 offshore convertible bonds issued by Yageo).
  • AHIL, to further take loan (debt financing) from offshore financial institutions through bridge loan agreements to fund the sale of shares in the tender offer.
(b) On Second Closing
After the tendered shares reach minimum shares requirement, prior to the closing of tender offer:
  • Further investment by CIHL Parent and TMPC HL and other relevant payments by CHIL Parent.
      (c) On Third Closing
Prior to the record date of merger between Yageo and Orion:
  • Further investment by CIHL Parent and TMPC HL and other relevant payments by CHIL Parent.
The Offeror shall further seek debt financing from domestic financial institutions.  Subject to availability and credit limit of such debt financing from domestic financial institutions, Alphard Investments Netherlands, may borrow funds from offshore financial institutions and provide such funds to the Offeror in the form of shareholder loan so as to pay a part of purchase price of the tender offer.

After, due consideration the IC took the view that the Yageo deal is a highly leveraged transaction where load to pay the debt would fall on Yageo after the merger between Yageo and Orion and if any default happens Yageo could not be saved (it must be noted Yageo is one of the leading passive manufacturer of passive electronic component in Taiwan, and perhaps, Taiwanese authority do not want a debt default like situation in Taiwan); and another reason could be that Taiwanese authority wants to protect the shareholders particularly the minority shareholders-who would be forced out of the company pursuant to merger between Yageo and Orion.

Scenario in Indian takeover deals

In a takeover deal involving Indian listed company, provisions of Securities and Exchange Board of India (Substantial Acquisition of Shares and Takeovers) Regulations, 1997 (Takeover Code) would be applicable.  Under regulation 16 (xiv) of the Takeover Code: (Contents of the Public Announcements) disclosure to the effect that firm arrangement for financial resources required to implement the offer is already in place, including details regarding the sources of the funds whether domestic, i.e., from banks, financial institutions or otherwise or foreign, i.e., from Non-Resident Indians or otherwise.

Indian regulations are more of disclosure oriented regulations, however in practise the SEBI, may ask for details from the acquirer about the funding sources and if found highly leveraged- I am not sure what and how would SEBI react to this.  As a market practise, in the public announcements made by the acquirer a standard clause is put, which is worded like:

The Acquirers and the PAC propose to finance the Offer through internal accruals, equity infusion and bank borrowings

Further as a market practice, the acquirer takes a certificate from the chartered accountants stating that the acquirers are financially fit to acquire the target company.  In my opinion, SEBI might take the view as taken by IC in the Yageo deal and the LBO structured buyouts might not work in India, given the current market situation and regulatory regime in India.  Additionally, the acquisition financing is not allowed/ permissible under the Indian laws (Indian regulations impose restrictions on the ability of banks in India in relation to acquisition financing, prohibiting them from lending to a borrower, irrespective of whether the borrower is located offshore or onshore).

If suppose, Yageo structured like deal as above comes to SEBI (but removing the aspects of debt financing), SEBI might not take block the deal, as in numerous occasions SEBI has cleared the deals (where the public announcement) states (for e.g., acquisition of Patni Computers by iGate):

The Acquirers and the PAC reserve the right to streamline/restructure the operations, assets, liabilities and/or businesses of the Target Company through arrangement/reconstruction, restructuring, merger (including but not limited to merger with itself or any of its subsidiaries), demerger/delisting of the Shares of the Target Company from the Stock Exchanges and/or sale of assets or undertakings, at a later date. Such decisions will be taken by the boards of Directors of Acquirers and the PAC and/or the Board of the Target Company in accordance with procedures set out by applicable law, and pursuant to business requirements and in line with opportunities or changes in the economic scenario, from time to time. The Acquirers and the PAC will evaluate and consider such proposals from time to time in accordance with the business requirements, if appropriate.





Tuesday, June 21, 2011

Unsecured loans advanced could be adjusted against allotment of shares in the rights issue

In a recent order dated 6 June, 2011 (SRM Energy Limited v. SEBI, Appeal No. 34 of 2011) (SRM Case), the  Securities Appellate Tribunal (SAT) set aside the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) order and allowed an appeal with a verdict that the unsecured loans can be adjusted against the allotment of shares in the rights issue.
In the SRM case’s scheme of things:
·         SEPL (a promoter of SRM Energy Limited) as on 31 December, 2010 had lent Rs. 4160.89 lacs of unsecured loan to SRM Energy Limited. 
·         On 13 August, 2010, shareholders of SRM Energy Limited passed a unanimous resolution through postal ballot approving the rights issue.  SEPL, was holding 71.19 % shares of SRM Energy Limited on the date of the right sissue, its entitlement in that issue worked out to 4,19,25,000 shares amounting to Rs. 4192.50 lacs.
·         SEPL by its letter dated 13 August, 2010 authorised SRM Energy Limited to adjust the unsecured loans provided to it towards its entitlement in the proposed rights issue (this was done based on the oral understanding between the parties).
·         SEBI objected to this arrangement and ordered that condition so section 81(3) of the Companies Act, 1956 (the Companies Act) should be strictly met.
Interpretation of section 81 of the Companies Act
SAT ordered that:  A bare reading of section 81 (1) makes it clear that when it is proposed to increase the subscribed capital of a company by allotment of further shares, the normal rule referred to therein needs to be followed.  The normal rule is that further shares must be offered to the existing body of shareholders of the company in the same proportion in which they already hold shares of the company.  The underlying object of this normal rule is to maintain the balance of voting rights and control in the company.  It is for this reason that section 81(1) mandatorily requires that further shares shall be offered to the existing shareholders in the same proportion to the capital paid up on these on the date of offer.  Section 81(1A), carves out an exception to the aforesaid normal rule and enables the company to offer further shares to a chosen few who may or may not be its shareholders.  When offer is made to this select group of persons, the section requires, as a condition precedent, that the general body of the shareholders must pass a special resolution in a general meeting authorizing and permitting the said allotment.  A special resolution is one which is passed by a majority of three fourth shareholders.  The underlying objective of this requirement is that the shareholders who are going to waive their right and entitlement to such further shares must agree to do so and if three fourth of them agree, that decision would bind the entire body of the shareholders.  It is pertinent to note that when the normal rule as aforesaid is resorted to, there is no requirement for the shareholders to pass any resolution, special or otherwise, because none of them is going to be deprived of the further allotment.  It is only when the company decides to deprive them of the further allotment that a resolution from them is required.
The opening words of section 81(3) makes it clear that cases which fall under this provision shall not be governed by section 81(1) and section 81(1A).  A reading of this provision makes it clear that it carves out yet another category/ exception for a preferential allotment to which section 81(1) and section 81(1A) shall not apply.  Section 81(3) would apply where a company has raised loans or issued debentures and these loans/ debentures have a stipulation attached thereto that the lender will be entitled to exercise an option to convert these loans/debentures into shares or subscribe to the shares of the company.  The proviso then imposes further restriction requiring the terms of the loan to be approved by the Central Government before the raising of the loan or such terms have to be in conformity with the rules made by the Central Government in that behalf and if the loan has been obtained from a person other than the government or a specified institution a special resolution approving the same has to be passed by the company in a general meeting before the loan is raised.
SAT’s decision
“The unsecured loans were payable on demand and SEPL could have demanded from the appellant the immediate return of those loans and then paid the money back to it towards the price of the shares allotted to SEPL in the rights issue.  It did not go through this ritual and instead, requested the appellant to adjust the amount of unsecured loans towards the price of shares allotted to it.  In other words, SEPL requested and made payment to the appellant by adjustment in the books of accounts.  Payment by adjustment in the books of account is a well-recognized mode by all accounting standards and we find no fault with this mode being adopted…In the strict sense of terms, it is not a conversion of a loan into equity.”
Takeaways for Capital Markets lawyers
·         There is no requirement to pass a special resolution for further issue of shares under section 81(1) of the Companies Act.
·         While drafting a rights issue offer document, in ‘objects of the issue’ section, following may be inserted-
Our Company intends to utilize the proceeds of the Issue towards repayment/adjustment of the unsecured loan forwarded to us by [name of the lender].
·         If a company has taken any loan, following may be inserted in the rights issue letter of offer:
Out of the total Rights entitlement of [●] Equity Shares amounting to Rs. [●], our promoter company/lender’s name [●], has, till [●], extended [●]as interest free unsecured loan (depends on the terms of issuance of loan) which has been utilized for [●]and meeting a part of the issue expenses. This amount will be fully adjusted against their entitlement/ additional subscription in the proposed Right issue.
I would like to put a caveat here; this order of SAT is appealed by SEBI in the Supreme Court and the above holds good only, if not reversed by the Supreme Court.